Extending the cooperative phenotype: Assessing the stability of cooperation across countries by Reigstad, Amanda Grindheim et al.
fpsyg-08-01990 November 13, 2017 Time: 16:57 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH








Yale University, United States
Nadav Klein,
University of Chicago, United States
Amos Schurr,






This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 13 July 2017
Accepted: 31 October 2017
Published: 15 November 2017
Citation:
Reigstad AG, Strømland EA and
Tinghög G (2017) Extending
the Cooperative Phenotype:





Phenotype: Assessing the Stability
of Cooperation across Countries
Amanda G. Reigstad1, Eirik A. Strømland1* and Gustav Tinghög2,3
1 Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, 2 JEDILAB, Department of Management and
Engineering, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 3 The National Center for Priority Setting in Health Care, Department
of Medical and Health Sciences, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over
time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study
documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in
Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate
with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display
of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether
temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find
similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings
here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward
prosociality – a “cooperative phenotype,” as it has recently been termed. Also in line with
previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.
Keywords: cooperation, social preferences, cooperative phenotype, prosocial behavior, trust
INTRODUCTION
There is a substantial body of literature in the social sciences showing that people are willing to
cooperate with others at personal cost.1 Theoretical models based on these experiments implicitly
assume that the findings capture general insights about human behavior. However, few studies have
explored to what extent the willingness to cooperate is stable across settings and over time. Such
knowledge is important for our ability to extrapolate and systematically learn from experimental
data.
This paper – based on a large sample of more than 7,000 individuals from Norway, Sweden,
Austria, and the United States – shows that cooperative behavior is stable across settings and
over time. The findings of this study support an implicit assumption underlying theories of
social preferences – namely, that people have a domain-general and stable predisposition toward
pro-sociality.
The idea of cooperation as a domain-general and stable personality trait has been dubbed
the “cooperative phenotype” (Peysakhovich et al., 2014) to emphasize that the willingness to
pay costs in order to benefit others is a stable and observable characteristic of an individual.
While experimental games cannot pinpoint whether such stability of cooperation is genetic
or environmental, they offer a promising opportunity to examine how widespread cooperative
behavior is across contexts and over time. Moreover, experimental games can be used to quantify
the strength of the relationship between different kinds of cooperative behavior in different settings.
1For summaries of this vast body of work, see e.g., Ledyard (1995), Chaudhuri (2011), and Engel (2011).
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Our study builds on previous work by Peysakhovich et al.
(2014) that showed, using United States data from Amazon
Mechanical Turk, that the same people tend to cooperate in
different games.2 The findings here also support a growing
set of studies on various aspects of the stability of pro-
social behavior.3 Volk et al. (2012) showed that conditional
contribution preferences are stable in a sample of lab students
repeatedly re-invited to a lab over a period of 5 months. Another
paper studying public-goods contributions in rural Vietnam
found that cooperative behavior in that setting is temporally
stable over long periods of time (Carlsson et al., 2014).4 Some
other papers have also shown that different measures of pro-
social behavior tend to be correlated across games (Yamagishi
et al., 2013; Capraro et al., 2014; Böckler et al., 2016; Epstein et al.,
2016).5
To our knowledge, this study is the first to explore inter-
country differences in the stability of cooperation across settings
and over time. This topic could be of substantial theoretical
significance: If cooperation exhibits varying degrees of stability
in different countries, it would have to be taken into account
by models of social preferences (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). It is quite possible that
cooperative behavior may exhibit varying degrees of stability in
different countries; behavior in various economic games has been
shown to display extensive cultural variation (Henrich et al., 2001;
Herrmann et al., 2008).6 Falk et al. (2015) found correlations
at the country level between survey measures of altruism, trust
and reciprocity, but a study by Chuang and Schechter (2015)
in Paraguay found much greater stability in survey measures
than measures obtained from incentivized economic games.
Differences in findings between survey measures and incentivized
games point to the need for studying correlations in game
behavior in addition to survey responses.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the data
and methods. Correlations across different games are then
analyzed, and then correlations between these measures and
a survey measure of general trust are addressed. Finally, this
paper examines temporal stability in the individual inclination
2Given that this study used the same analysis criteria as Peysakhovich et al. (2014),
the findings here can be considered to be out-of-sample tests on their results.
Recent replication failures in the behavioral sciences (Open Science Collaboration,
2015; Camerer et al., 2016) underscore the importance of replicating previous
work.
3Other studies on the stability of other kinds of behavior include Cobb-Clark and
Schurer (2012), which showed that the “Big Five” are stable over a time period of
4 years for working adults; Dasgupta et al. (2017), which tested for the stability
of state-dependent preferences; and Meier and Sprenger (2015), which studied the
stability of time preferences.
4Blanco et al. (2011) studied whether inequity aversion predicts behavior over time
across different games and on an individual level. They found overall stability, but
not on an individual level.
5Fischbacher et al. (2012) showed that different methods of measuring
cooperation – the strategy method vs. direct responses – yield the same conclusions
(the “strategy method” asks for choices for each hypothetical choice made by one’s
partner in a game).
6Although all four countries in this study are Western, industrialized nations,
Norway and the United States are also quite different in a number of respects, such
as income distribution (Almås et al., 2016).
to cooperate. Moreover, we compare time trends of cooperative
behavior in the United States and Norway.
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS
To minimize researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons et al.,
2011), this paper adopted the analysis of Peysakhovich et al.
(2014) as a benchmark. Thus, overall cross-sectional correlations
in different game measures of cooperation are first considered.
A stability measure of cooperative behavior over time is
then constructed and compared between Norway and the
United States. Finally, a formal test for systematic differences in
cooperation trends between countries is conducted.7
Norwegian Data: Methods and
Procedures
Data from Norway was retrieved from a survey sent out to
the “Norwegian Citizen Panel” (NCP), an online panel of
a representative cross-section of the Norwegian population
(Ivarsflaten et al., 2015). The survey sent out to the panel
members included a series of incentivized economic games
capturing different aspects of pro-social behavior: The Dictator
Game (DG), the Public Goods Game (PGG) and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD). The survey also included a measure of general
trust.
The DG is a game that measures altruism by asking a subject
how much to share with a stranger. In the PGG, each individual
in a group makes a choice about whether to contribute to a
common pool. Finally, in the PD, each subject makes a binary
choice about whether to cooperate with a randomly assigned
partner. In both the PGG and the PD there are incentives
to be selfish, but the group would benefit from cooperation.
Following Peysakhovich et al. (2014), this study only included
games in which no reputational incentives to cooperate were
involved.
In addition to the economic games, the Norwegian Citizen
Panel survey mainly includes general questions relating to politics
and society. However, these survey questions are not included in
our analysis, as they are not related to the main research question
addressed in this study.
Panel members of the NCP are recruited through an invitation
letter that is sent to a random sample of nearly 25,000
individuals listed in the Norwegian population registry with
a current Norwegian address. The registry contains records
of everyone born in Norway, as well as former and current
inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 95. A total of 4,870
respondents registered for the NCP (Ivarsflaten et al., 2015).
As some attrition is expected, the panel is refreshed at regular
intervals through the sending out of new invitation letters. The
final sample contains individuals from various age categories
(such as young adults close to 20 years of age, or individuals
above 60), a range of education categories (no education, only
elementary school, higher education) and from all different
7Appendix A, Tables A2, A3 reproduce the findings reported in Peysakhovich et al.
(2014).
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TABLE 1 | Overview of the Norwegian data material.
Measure Wave N
Dictator Game First 5,244
Public Goods Game First 605
General Trust First 5,429
Prisoner’s Dilemma Second 1,079
Dictator Game w/Punishment Second 1,060
Punishment Second 243
geographical regions in Norway. It is worth noting that while
the distribution of men and women in Norway is approximately
49.9 and 50.1%, in the NCP there are 50.3% men and 49.7%
women.8
This paper employs data from December 2015 to April 2016,
during which time a random subsample of the NCP participated
in several economic games. The survey was conducted online.
When subjects arrived at the part of the survey that involves
economic games, they were informed that they would be making
decisions that could result in real monetary payment. For each
subsequent question they received separate instructions, and
were required to make a choice by using a slider or filling out
a number on the screen. After they made their choice and clicked
to proceed with the survey, they were unable to go back to
revise their response. Decisions were incentivized by informing
participants that some decisions would be drawn for actual
payment.
After the survey was concluded, researchers followed a
double-blind process in which one researcher received the
list of survey IDs and corresponding payment from the firm
programming the survey, and then put payments into closed
envelopes marked with the survey IDs. A second researcher
received a list linking survey IDs to respondent names and
addresses, and posted these in the mail without knowing anything
about what each participant earned in the study.
Table 1 summarizes the Norwegian data, the games included,
and the time of the data collection.9 Brief summaries of the
games included are provided below Table 1, while Appendix B
provides detailed instructions for each game. The instructions
were translated from Norwegian by the firm that provides
the data (Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2016). In each game, all
participants were randomly assigned to play another participant
without receiving any information about each other.
The DG was conducted with 5,244 participants. In the DG,
the “dictator” is assigned 2,000 Norwegian kroner10 (NOK), and
asked to choose how much, in intervals of 100 NOK, to share with
a randomly drawn individual. In the DG conducted in the NCP,
two participants were randomly chosen to be either a dictator
or a recipient. Participants were instructed that two participants
from the total sample would randomly be assigned the role of
either dictator or recipient. Hence, a random dictator rule was
8These figures may change somewhat over time as the panel recruits new
respondents.
9Generally, the attrition rate is low. In Appendix A, Table A7 we report detailed
data on attrition rates for each question included in the NCP data.
10Approximately 240 USD.
employed by which each person had an equal chance of dictating
the result, and strategic considerations were eliminated.
The PGG was conducted with 605 participants. Each
participant was allowed to choose how much of an endowment
of 1,000 NOK11 he or she wished to contribute to a common
pool. The amount contributed was then multiplied by a factor
larger than one, and then evenly distributed among the group
members. Consequently, in material terms it was payoff-
maximizing to contribute zero regardless of what the other
players decided. However, the group as a whole would benefit
if all members contributed fully to the common pool. The
particular PGG implemented in the NCP differed somewhat
from the standard setup, in that one participant in each group
of three was randomly excluded before the common pool was
divided between the two remaining members of the group.12
Three subjects were randomly drawn to receive payment, and
subjects were informed about the drawing prior to making any
decisions.
The PD was conducted with 1,079 participants, who choose
either to cooperate (“left”) or defect (“right”). If both players
chose to cooperate, they received 800 NOK13 each. If one defected
while the other cooperated, he or she received 1,200 NOK while
the other got zero. Finally, if both defected, they each received
400 NOK14. Eight participants were randomly chosen to receive
payment based on their decisions.
The Dictator Game with Punishment (DGP) was answered
by 1,060 participants. The participant chose how much of
1,000 NOK to share with a randomly selected person, in
preset amounts of 1, 250, 500, 750, or 1000. Afterward,
participants could voluntarily decide how much to reduce the
payoff to whoever kept the highest amount in a randomly
selected sample of three participants. This “punishment” decision
was voluntary, a fact that was stressed in the instructions
to the participants. Despite being costless, only 367 chose
to punish. In total, three participants were randomly drawn
to receive payment based on their decisions in this game.
The one who shared the least among these three was
punished.15
Generalized Trust (GT) was measured in the first wave
using the standard World Trust Survey question. Participants
considered the claim, “Most people are to be trusted” on a scale
from 0 to 10, where 0 is “can’t be careful enough” and 10 is “most
people are to be trusted.” For the purposes of this study, this
11Approximately 120 USD.
12The rationale for this unconventional design is that this PGG was part of a larger
experiment testing whether incentives to be part of a group shapes cooperation.
This study used data on the control group that featured random exclusion of one
of the three group members, which means that contributions do not determine




15Because a coding error enabled invalid punishment responses (the program
allowed for punishment levels outside of the possible range), only those
punishment decisions that were valid in the analysis were included. Of 367
participants, the decisions of 243 remained. The results remained unchanged even
if all punishment responses were included except for a single extreme outlier (with
an invalid punishment level of 150,000).
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TABLE 2 | Pearson correlations, Norway.





PD 0.0451 0.1306∗ 1
(915) (456) (1079)
DGP 0.2541∗∗∗ 0.2435∗∗∗ 0.1191∗∗∗ 1
(902) (450) (1026) (1060)
Punishment 0.0400 0.0466 0.0424 0.2698∗∗∗ 1
(211) (95) (241) (241) (243)
N in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values Bonferroni
corrected to adjust for multiple comparisons. PGG, Public Goods Game; DG,
Dictator Game; PD, Prisoner’s Dilemma; DGP, Dictator Game with Punishment;
Punishment, Amount subtracted from player who kept most money.
variable was converted to a scale from 0 to 5, in order to make
the results directly comparable to Peysakhovich et al. (2014).16
Results from Norwegian Data
Table 2 displays pairwise (Pearson) correlations using the
Norwegian data. All p-values are Bonferroni-corrected to adjust
for multiple comparisons.
The different cooperation measures are significantly
correlated. Notably, the correlation between DG giving and
PGG contributions is quite large, with a correlation coefficient
of 0.22. The correlation between the PD and other games is a
bit smaller in magnitude, but qualitatively similar. The only two
cooperation measures that are uncorrelated are the PD and the
DG in the first wave, where a small positive and not statistically
significant (p > 0.10) correlation is observed.17 Except for the
DGP, significant correlations between the punishment measure
and the measures of cooperation were not found.18 This result
may have occurred because these choices were made sequentially
by the same participants – first subjects chose an amount to
share if drawn as dictator, and only afterward make a voluntary
decision about whether and how much to punish the person
who shares the least amount. The positive correlation between
punishment and sharing in the DGP may reflect that those who
choose to punish expect others to punish as well, and therefore
perceive it to be in their self-interest to be pro-social in this
specific game. This would also explain why the punishment
measure does not correlate with any of the other measures of
pro-sociality.
Finally, we test whether the behavioral measures correlate with
general trust. Figure 1 visually displays the regression results
16The scale was converted by dividing the original scores in two, making a score
of 10 equal to a score of 5, a score of 9 equal to a score of 4.5, and so forth.
This has the benefit of preserving the same relationship between values as the
original scale, while also making direct comparisons easier to interpret. By doing
this, no information is lost. Moreover, the reported pairwise (Pearson) correlation
coefficients are invariant to scale.
17We do not conduct a factor-analysis, as this is not recommended when all
correlations are weaker than 0.3 (Tabachnick et al., 2014, p. 667).
18In Appendix A, we display alternative non-parametric Spearman correlations.
FIGURE 1 | Regressions of generalized trust on behavioral measures (NCP
data), with 95% confidence intervals. DG, Dictator Game; PGG, Public Goods
Game; PD, Prisoner’s Dilemma; DGP, Dictator Game with Punishment.
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations (Sweden, Austria, and the United States).
DG PGG MD
SWE (n = 199)
DG 1
PGG 0.1158 1
MD −0.2846∗∗∗ 0.0054 1
United States (n = 582)
DG 1
PGG 0.3089∗∗∗ 1
MD −0.0979 −0.0253 1
AUS (n = 320)
DG 1
PGG 0.1291 1
MD −0.0502 0.055 1
Total (n = 1101)
DG 1
PGG 0.2115∗∗∗ 1
MD −0.0835∗ −0.0020 1
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p–values Bonferroni corrected for 12
independent comparisons. DG, Dictator Game; PGG, Public Goods Game; MD,
Moral Dilemma (The Trolley Problem).
from the regression of general trust on the different games
included in the NCP. Except for the DGP, all behavioral measures
correlate significantly with the measure of GT. This finding
replicates results reported in Peysakhovich et al. (2014) that the
PGG and DG are correlated with general trust.
Swedish, Austrian and Additional
American Data
The final data set used in this study to assess the domain-
generality of cooperative behavior is a data set from Tinghög et al.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1990
fpsyg-08-01990 November 13, 2017 Time: 16:57 # 5
Reigstad et al. Extending the Cooperative Phenotype
FIGURE 2 | (A) Average cooperation in the NCP second wave for each type defined using first wave data (95% confidence intervals). (B) Coefficient plot from
Peysakhovich et al. (2014).
FIGURE 3 | Histogram of stability measure in the United States and Norway.
(2013, 2016), featuring 1,101 individuals in Sweden, Austria, and
the United States. The participants were given a PGG and a DG,
as well as asked to render a decision on a Moral Dilemma (MD)19.
In Sweden and Austria, data were collected in a lab setting, with
student samples recruited through email. Data collection in the
United States was conducted as a web survey, with subjects drawn
from a sample of the adult American population included in the
subject pool for Decision Research. Table 3 displays separate and
overall correlations.
Overall giving in the DG is correlated with contributions to a
public good (p < 0.01). With Bonferroni-corrections the results
are not significant individually for Sweden and Austria, but this
may result from this correction being overly conservative due
to the assumption that the tests are independent. Appendix A
19Whereas Tinghög et al. (2013, 2016) looks at the effects of time pressure and
cognitive load on different economic decisions, this study pools these data and
studies general correlation patterns across different games.
displays uncorrected p-values. Here, the separate correlation
coefficient for Austria is also statistically significant (p < 0.05).
While the correlation between PGG giving and DG sharing is
high and quantitatively similar for this American data set and the
American data set in Peysakhovich et al. (2014), the estimated
correlations between the PGG and DG are somewhat smaller in
the Swedish and Austrian sample (although qualitatively similar).
Stability of Cooperation Over Time in
Norway and the United States
This paper now turns to the question of whether cooperative
behavior is stable over time. The Norwegian data from the first
wave was used to classify respondents into three cooperative
types, following the classification procedure in Peysakhovich
et al. (2014). Defectors are defined as those who share or
contribute zero of their endowment in both the PGG and the
DG. Cooperators are those who give or contribute more than 1%
but less than 100% of their available total endowment. Finally,
Super-cooperators contribute and share 100% in both games.











Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on subject). ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Reference group: Norway
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An overall cooperation measure was created in the second
wave by taking the mean of the DG and the PD decision. We then
tested whether second-wave cooperation was associated with the
pre-defined type measures. Figure 2A displays the results, and
Figure 2B the corresponding findings reported in Peysakhovich
et al. (2014). These results are robust to changing the cutoffs
defining the cooperative types (see Appendix A).
Although the two waves in the NCP are measured
approximately 4 months apart, a great degree of temporal
stability was observed on the aggregate level.20 Defectors
have much lower mean cooperation in the second wave
than cooperators. In both Norway and the United States,
cooperators exhibited roughly 50% mean cooperation, compared
to approximately three-fifths for super-cooperators. Defectors
in Norway cooperated about 30% in the second wave, while the
corresponding figure in the United States was 21%. The results
are strikingly similar between countries.
This study also defined a stability measure for each individual
and compared it between countries. For each individual, a
difference measure was defined by subtracting the average
decision in the games played at time 1 from the average decision
in the games played at time 2, and then taking the absolute value
of this measure. This difference measure was then subtracted
from one in order to obtain a stability measure. Thus, denoting
by
−
y1i the average decision made at time 1 and by
−
y2i the average
decision made at time 2, the stability measure is:
Si = 1−
∣∣∣ −y2i− −y1i∣∣∣
This number is constructed to be in a unit interval [0, 1], as all
variables have been normalized to one prior to defining it. The
stability measure may therefore be interpreted as a measure of
how similar decisions are between the two measurement waves.
A measure of zero indicates that none of the decisions are similar,
while a measure of one means that all decisions are identical.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the stability measure in the
United States and Norway using the data from the NCP and from
Peysakhovich et al. (2014).
As Figure 3 shows, whereas stability is high on average,
there appears to be a substantial amount of individual variation.
Overall, 70.8% of individual responses may be categorized as high
stability (the stability measure is over 0.67), 7.5% of responses
have low stability (measure below 0.33), and the rest have a
medium level of stability. (See Appendix Table A6 for details.)
Thus, viewing the entire sample as a whole, there appears to
be a high degree of stability both on the aggregate and on the
individual level.
This paper now formally addresses inter-country differences
in the temporal stability of cooperative behavior. Because this
study did not have access to common demographic variables
measured in both American and Norwegian data, it was not
possible to directly control for demographic factors. However,
by running a difference-in-differences regression model and
controlling for individual fixed effects (FE), this analysis
20In the American data, the average time between the first and last decision was
124 days (Peysakhovich et al., 2014).
indirectly adjusted for all individual- and country-specific time-
invariant effects that may influence cooperation. This was done
by regressing the overall cooperation measure at time t for
individual i on a constant, a dummy variable for wave 2, a
country dummy and a set of individual-specific fixed effects
that capture all time-invariant characteristics of individuals
that influence cooperation. Table 4 displays the regression
results.
Table 4 shows that mean cooperation, measured at 48.3%,
is high in wave 1. There appears to be almost no change
between the two waves; the coefficient on the wave 2 dummy
is close to zero and not statistically significant. Moreover, while
the difference-in-differences estimate indicates that cooperation
decreases slightly more in the United States than in Norway
over time (5 percentage points), this difference is not statistically
significant at the 5% level. Thus, the null hypothesis that Norway
and the United States display identical time-trends in cooperative
behavior cannot be rejected.
It is worth noting that the regression results ultimately capture
correlations. While all time-constant factors systematically
influencing cooperation can be controlled for, other time-
varying factors could systematically influence the time-trends
in cooperation. For instance, the American sample features
Amazon Mechanical Turk, while the Norwegian sample
is from the NCP. There may be systematic differences
over time in the demographic composition of these two
samples.21
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study has shown that across several countries, different
economic game measures of cooperation are positively correlated
across settings. The data analyzed here also indicates that
cooperative decisions are remarkably similar over time.
Moreover, a comparison of Norway and the United States did not
reject the null hypothesis of identical time-trends in cooperation
over time. Overall, this analysis supports the hypothesis that
human motivation is well captured by a “cooperative phenotype,”
or a general behavioral disposition to pay costs to benefit
others.
The result that prosocial behavior is on the overall level
uncorrelated with punishment is in line with the findings
reported in Peysakhovich et al. (2014). This empirical pattern
seems inconsistent with theoretical models suggesting that
altruism underlies the motivation to punish (e.g., Boyd et al.,
2003; Hauert et al., 2007), and suggests that other potential
mechanisms, such as anger, may explain punishing behavior
(Jordan et al., 2016).
The findings of this study can contribute to further research
into building general models of human motivation. The fact that
the same people tend to cooperate in different games and over
21For instance, more women may drop out of the Norwegian survey between the
two waves than in the United States sample. See Arechar et al. (2017) for a study on
how participant characteristics vary over time on Amazon Mechanical Turk and
Horton et al. (2011) for a general description of Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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time suggests that one could build theoretical models of behavior
in one setting and use the theory to predict cooperative behavior
in a different context or time. As pro-social behavior exhibits a
high degree of stability in Norway and the United States, there
does not seem to be a pressing need to incorporate country-
specific assumptions concerning the stability of other-regarding
motivations.
While this sample was restricted to western, educated,
industrialized, rich and democratic (“WEIRD”) societies
(Henrich et al., 2010), the findings here are consistent with both a
study conducted on correlation across games in Japan (Yamagishi
et al., 2013) and another conducted in rural Vietnam (Volk et al.,
2012). Viewed together with these studies, the findings here
suggest that the “cooperative phenotype” persists across countries
that are culturally quite different.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 | Spearman-correlations, Norway.





PD 0.0415 0.1220∗ 1
(915) (456) (1079)
DGP 0.2396∗∗∗ 0.2066∗∗∗ 0.1250∗∗∗ 1
(902) (450) (1026) (1060)
Punishment −0.0042 0.0312 0.0758 0.3464∗∗∗ 1
(211) (95) (241) (241) (243)
N in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons.
TABLE A2 | Summarizes the results in Peysakhovich et al. (2014), featuring approximately 1,400 individuals recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The main takeaway is
that different measures of cooperation are correlated, but unrelated to punishment. Pearson-correlations, United States.
PGG DG TG1 TG2 UGMAO PUND TPP AP
PGG 1
DG 0.3887∗∗∗ 1
TG1 0.3365∗∗∗ 0.3483∗∗∗ 1
TG2 0.3861∗∗∗ 0.4948∗∗∗ 0.4927∗∗∗ 1
UGMAO 0.1051 0.0631 0.0422 0.1179 1
PUND −0.0298 0.0658 0.0679 0.1472∗∗ 0.1809∗∗∗ 1
TPP 0.0549 −0.0118 0.0631 0.0759 0.1593∗∗∗ 0.3550∗∗∗ 1
AP 0.0202 0.0890 0.0281 0.0031 0.1048 0.1513∗∗ 0.0900 1
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. PGG, Public Goods Game; DG, Dictator Game; TG1, First mover, Trust Game;
TG2, Second mover, Trust Game; UGMAO, Minimum acceptable offer, Ultimatum Game; TPP, Third-party punishment; PUND, Second-party punishment, Prisoner’s
Dilemma; AP, Two-player, sealed-bid All Pay Auction game.
TABLE A3 | Summarizes the results in Peysakhovich et al. (2014), featuring approximately 1,400 individuals recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The main takeaway is
that different measures of cooperation are correlated, but unrelated to punishment. Spearman-correlations, United States.
PGG DG TG1 TG2 UGMAO PUND TPP AP
PGG 1
DG 0.4525∗∗∗ 1
TG1 0.3477∗∗∗ 0.3449∗∗∗ 1
TG2 0.4142∗∗∗ 0.4764∗∗∗ 0.4650∗∗∗ 1
UGMAO 0.0951 0.0534 0.0515 0.1277 1
PUND 0.0129 0.0669 0.0675 0.1171 0.1978∗∗∗ 1
TPP 0.0947 0.0284 0.0793 0.1037 0.1627∗∗∗ 0.3991∗∗∗ 1
AP 0.0455 0.0857 0.0246 −0.0282 0.1055 0.1658∗∗∗ 0.1180 1
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. PGG, Public Goods Game; DG, Dictator Game; TG1, First mover, Trust Game;
TG2, Second mover, Trust Game; UGMAO, Minimum acceptable offer, Ultimatum Game; TPP, Third-party punishment; PUND, Second-party punishment, Prisoner’s
Dilemma; AP, Two-player, sealed-bid All Pay Auction game.
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FIGURE A1 | Coefficient plot, robustness check on findings in Figure 2.
TABLE A4 | Uncorrected p-values.
DG Raw p PGG Raw p MD
SWE (n = 199)
DG 1
PGG 0,1158 0,1034 1
MD −0.2846∗∗∗ <0.0001 0,0054 0,9392 1
United States (n = 582)
DG 1
PGG 0.3089∗∗∗ <0.0001 1
MD −0.0979∗∗ 0,0182 −0,0253 0,5427 1
AUS (n = 320)
DG 1
PGG 0.1291∗∗ 0.0209 1
MD −0,0502 0,3714 0,055 0,3271 1
Total (n = 1101)
DG 1
PGG 0.2115∗∗∗ <0.0001 1
MD −0.0835∗∗ 0,0056 −0,0020 0,9458 1
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE A5 | Regression of general trust on behavioral measures (dependent
variable ranges from 0 to 5).









Constant 3.239∗∗∗ 3.227∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗ 3.427∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0876) (0.0577) (0.0599)
N 5225 602 932 918
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE A6 | Degree of stability in the United States, Norway and overall.
Stability United States Norway Overall
Low 18.6% 3.1% 7.5%
Middle 22.1% 21.6% 21.7%
High 59.3% 75.3% 70.8%
N 344 876 1220
“Low” stability is defined as those with a stability measure less than 0.33, “High”
is individuals with a stability measure higher than 0.67, and “Middle” is those in
between.








The high attrition rate for the “Punishment” variable may be because subjects were
explicitly informed that they could voluntary opt out of this decision.
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GAMES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS
(TRANSLATED FROM NORWEGIAN)
Dictator Game
As a participant in the Norwegian Citizen Panel you are being
included in a draw for an extra monetary prize. Two people
are drawn out: person A and person B. Person A receives 2,000
kroner and chooses how much is to be shared with person B. If I
receive 2,000 kroner, I choose to give the following amount to the
other person (between 0 and 2,000):
Trust
Would you say that most people in general can be trusted, or do
you think that one cannot be careful enough when dealing with
others?
State your opinion on the scale below. This goes from 0 to 10,
where 0 means “Cannot be careful enough” and 10 means “Most
people can be trusted.”
PGG – 1
Three participants in the Norwegian Citizen Panel are drawn to
win an extra cash prize. These three are put together in a group.
Every person in the group receives 1,000 kroner to begin with.
The final amount of the cash prize depends on what choices the
people in the group make in the decisions below. Each participant
is to choose how much of his or her 1,000 kroner will be put into
a joint kitty for the group. A person is drawn at random to be
excluded from the group and loses his or her 1,000 kroner. The
two remaining people’s contribution to the kitty is increased by
50 percent and then divided equally between the two. The final
cash prize is each individual’s portion of the kitty and the money
that was kept.
If you were drawn out to win 1,000 kroner, how much would
you put into the joint kitty?
PGG – 2
Three participants in the Norwegian Citizen Panel are drawn to
win an extra cash prize. These three are put together in a group.
Every person in the group receives 1,000 kroner to begin with.
The final amount of the cash prize depends on what choices the
people in the group make in the decisions below. Each participant
is to choose how much of his or her 1,000 kroner will be put into
a joint kitty for the group. A person is drawn at random to be
excluded from the group, but keeps his or her 1,000 kroner. The
two remaining people’s contribution to the kitty is increased by
50 percent and then divided equally between the two. The final
cash prize is each individual’s portion of the kitty and the money
that was kept.
If you were drawn out to win 1,000 kroner, how much would
you put into the joint kitty?
PD – 1
We will now ask you a question concerning taking a decision. We
have drawn out four people who are paid based on the decision
they take. You are completely anonymous and is to take only one
decision.
You must choose to go either left or right. You will be
randomly grouped with one other person who will take the same
decision. How much you earn is dependent on the decisions you
make: If you both choose to go left, you will receive 800 kroner
each. If you choose to go left and the other person chooses to go
right, you will receive 0 kroner and the other person will receive
1200 kroner. If you choose to go right and the other person
chooses to go left, you will receive 1200 kroner and the other
person will receive 0 kroner. If you both choose to go right, you
will both receive 400 kroner each. Regardless of what the other
person chooses, you stand to receive more by going right. The
sum of the pay-out is biggest if both choose to go left.
PD – 2
We will now ask you a question concerning taking a decision. We
have drawn out four people who are paid based on the decision
they take. You are completely anonymous and is to take only one
decision.
You must choose to go either left or right. You will be
randomly grouped with one other person who will take the same
decision. How much you earn is dependent on the decisions you
make: If you both choose to go left, you will receive 800 kroner
each. If you choose to go left and the other person chooses to go
right, you will receive 0 kroner and the other person will receive
1200 kroner. If you choose to go right and the other person
chooses to go left, you will receive 1200 kroner and the other
person will receive 0 kroner. If you both choose to go right, you
will both receive 400 kroner each. Regardless of what the other
person chooses, you stand to receive more by going right. The
sum of the pay-out is biggest if both choose to go left.
DGP – 1
As a participant in the Norwegian Citizen Panel you and two
other participants can be drawn out to win an extra cash prize
of 1,000 kroner. If you are drawn out, you must all make two
decisions. As decision 1, you must choose how much of the
1,000 kroner you would give a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. As decision 2, you can choose to reduce
the final prize of the one of the other two persons who has kept
most of his or her 1,000 kroner.
Decision 1: If you were drawn out, how much of the 1,000
kroner would you give to a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel?
DGP – 2
As a participant in the Norwegian Citizen Panel you and two
other participants can be drawn out to win an extra cash prize
of 1,000 kroner. If you are drawn out, you must all make two
decisions. As decision 1, you must choose how much of the
1,000 kroner you would give a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. As decision 2, you can choose to reduce
the final prize of the one of the other two persons who has given
least of his or her 1,000 kroner.
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Decision 1: If you were drawn out, how much of the 1,000
kroner would you give to a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel?
DGP – 3
As a participant in the Norwegian Citizen Panel you and two
other participants can be drawn out to win an extra cash prize
of 1,000 kroner. If you are drawn out, you must all make two
decisions. As decision 1, you must choose how much of the
1,000 kroner you would give a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. As decision 2, you can choose to reduce
the final prize of the one of the other two persons who has kept
most of his or her 1,000 kroner.
Decision 1: If you were drawn out, how much of the 1,000
kroner would you give to a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel?
DGP – 4
As a participant in the Norwegian Citizen Panel you and two
other participants can be drawn out to win an extra cash prize
of 1,000 kroner. If you are drawn out, you must all make two
decisions. As decision 1, you must choose how much of the
1,000 kroner you would give a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. As decision 2, you can choose to reduce
the final prize of the one of the other two persons who has given
least of his or her 1,000 kroner.
Decision 1: If you were drawn out, how much of the 1,000
kroner would you give to a randomly selected member of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel.
Punishment
For each question the respondent is presented with a sum of 0,
250, 500, 750, or 1000 kr
1:
Decision 2: In this decision, you can choose to reduce the final
prize of the person who has kept most of his or her 1,000 kroner
Then I wish to reduce the prize to this person by the following
amount:
2:
Decision 2: In this decision, you can choose to reduce the final
prize of the person who has given least of his or her 1,000
kroner
Then I wish to reduce the prize to this person by the following
amount:
3:
Decision 2: In this decision, you can choose to reduce the final
prize of the person who has kept most of his or her 1,000
kroner.
Then I wish to reduce the prize to this person by the following
amount:
4:
Decision 2: In this decision, you can choose to reduce the final
prize of the person who has given least of his or her 1,000
kroner.
Then I wish to reduce the prize to this person by the following
amount:
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